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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Mexican federal government relied on its military to instill 
public order in Mexico throughout the twentieth century.1 The armed 
 
 1. See CENTRO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS DE LA MONTAÑA TLACHINOLLAN 
[TLACHINOLLAN MOUNTAIN CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS], La militarización en la 
montaña: Abusos crecientes y ausencia de controles civiles [The Militarization of 
  
2012] BURYING THE RIGHT TO JUSTICE 957 
forces increasingly supplanted police forces during the Mexican 
Dirty War in the 1970s to 1980s to suppress indigenous and peasant 
social movements, particularly in southern Mexico.2 In the 1990s, the 
military was used to quell the uprisings of the Zapatista National 
Liberation Army (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional) 
(EZLN) and the Popular Revolutionary Army (Ejército Popular 
Revolucionario).3 In the decades since, Mexican presidents have 
relied on the military to fulfill traditional police roles, continue to 
suppress uprisings, combat the drug trade, and weaken organized 
crime.4 During President Felipe Calderón’s administration, the 
government initiated the “war on drugs,”5 and increased its use of the 
 
the Mountain: Growing Abuses and Lack of Civilian Control], in LUCHAR PARA 
CONSTRUIR EL AMANECER DE LA JUSTICIA 56, 57–60 (Atziri Ávila & Román 
Hernández eds., 2011) [hereinafter TLACHINOLLAN] (describing the use of the 
Mexican armed forces in public security throughout the twentieth century in 
repressing political opposition and social movements). 
 2. See id. (noting that the Mexican Dirty War resulted in the forced 
disappearances of over one thousand Mexican citizens as well as torture and 
extrajudicial killings); SUSANA NISTAL & IÑIGO PRIETO, PEACE BRIGADES 
INTERNATIONAL, HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS IN THE STATE OF GUERRERO 33 
(2007), available at http://www.protectionline.org/IMG/pdf/Defenderes_ 
Guerrero_PBI_Mexico_ENG.pdf (noting that initially the Mexican federal 
government used the military to suppress movements such as the Zapatista Army 
of National Liberation in Chiapas; however, after the guerrilla groups were largely 
quashed in the 1980s “the army was incorporated into civil police bodies”); see 
also Graham H. Turbiville, Mexico’s Multimission Force for Internal Security, 80 
MIL. REV. 41, 44 (2000) (describing the incorporation of thousands of military 
officers and equipment into the federal police force in the late 1990s). 
 3. See TLACHINOLLAN, supra note 1, at 58 (noting that in the 1990s the 
passing of the “General Law” [Ley General] — which increased coordination 
between the military and the national police — coincided with active and retired 
military agents assuming roles in public security and justice administration). 
 4. Id.; see also Ken Ellingwood, Mexico Military Faces Political Risks Over 
Drug War, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/mar/23/ 
world/la-fg-mexico-army23-2010mar23 (referring to the Mexican military as the 
“tip of the spear” in the “war on drug cartels” and noting that since 2006, 50,000 
military personnel have been performing tasks such as manning roadblocks, 
patrolling cities, and performing searches in houses). 
 5. See COLLEEN W. COOK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34215, MEXICO'S 
DRUG CARTELS (2007) (discussing violence among warring drug cartels and the 
Mexican Armed Forces that characterizes the “war on drugs” and noting that drug 
cartels have gained power since the demise of the Colombian drug cartels in the 
1990s). Mexico is now the leading supplier country of illicit substances to the 
United States. Id.; see also, e.g., José Eleazar Ávila, ¡40,000 muertos! ¿Cuántos 
más?... [40,000 Dead! How Many More?], MILENIO (June 14, 2011), 
http://impreso.milenio.com/node/8975565 (estimating the death toll to be 40,000 
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armed forces to fulfill civilian police roles.6  
The increase in military presence in civilian law enforcement 
forces correlates to an increase in crimes committed by the military 
against civilians.7 The majority of these crimes have gone 
unpunished because crimes committed by the military against 
civilians are subject to military jurisdiction under the Military Justice 
Code, as opposed to the civilian law enforcement and judicial 
regime.8 The consequence is unbridled impunity for soldiers who 
commit crimes against civilians.9 Military adjudication of crimes 
against civilians creates institutional hesitancy of tribunal members 
 
people); Progress in Mexico Drug War is Blood-Drenched, MSNBC.COM (Mar. 10, 
2009),http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29620369/ns/world_news-
americas/t/progress-mexico-drug-war-blood-drenched/#.T1eEmfGPVZo 
(describing the increase in deaths associated with the “war on drugs,” and noting 
that deaths doubled from 2008 to 2009). 
 6. See Christina M. Fetterhoff, Military Justice Reform in Mexico Amid 
Increased Violence, CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & HUMANITARIAN LAW (Oct. 19, 
2011),http://hrbrief.org/2011/10/military-justice-reform-in-mexico-amid-
increased-violence/ (noting the Calderón Administration deployed over 40,000 
troops and the number of alleged human rights abuses committed by the military 
increased). 
 7. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NEITHER RIGHTS NOR SECURITY: KILLINGS, 
TORTURE, AND DISAPPEARANCES IN MEXICO’S “WAR ON DRUGS” 5 (2011) 
[hereinafter NEITHER RIGHTS NOR SECURITY] (concluding that the current policy 
has led to an increase in human rights violations, including allegations of torture, 
extrajudicial killings, and enforced disappearances); see also Mexico’s Supreme 
Court Ends Military Jurisdiction for Soldiers Committing Human Rights 
Violations, INT’L DRUG POL’Y CONSORTIUM, http://www.idpc.net/fr/node/1775 
(last visited Oct. 10, 2011) [hereinafter IDPC] (explaining that during the Calderón 
Administration, Mexican citizens filed almost 5,000 complaints against the 
military for human rights violations, including more than 1,000 in 2010 alone). 
 8. See Código de Justicia Militar [CMJ] [Military Justice Code] art. 57(II)(A), 
Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 31 de Agosto de 1933 (Mex.) (requiring 
crimes committed by soldiers in times of service to be investigated and adjudicated 
under military jurisdiction); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UNIFORM IMPUNITY: 
MEXICO’S MISUSE OF MILITARY JUSTICE TO PROSECUTE ABUSES IN 
COUNTERNARCOTICS AND PUBLIC SECURITY OPERATIONS 
 13 (2009) [hereinafter UNIFORM IMPUNITY] (explaining that the Mexican military 
has expanded the scope of its jurisdiction to include human rights violations 
committed by soldiers against civilians). 
 9. See NEITHER RIGHTS NOR SECURITY, supra note 7, at 10 (noting that the 
military prosecutor’s office has opened over 3,000 cases of human rights violations 
perpetrated by the military against civilians and revealing that soldiers were 
convicted in less than one half of one percent of these cases). 
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to enforce the law.10  
Over the past decade, the Inter-American Human Rights system 
issued recommendations and decisions in several cases that involved 
military officers committing crimes against civilians.11 The Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (“IACtHR”) heard four cases 
since 2008 in which members of the Mexican military were held to 
have committed grave human rights violations.12 The IACtHR has 
consistently held that military investigation and adjudication of 
crimes committed by the military against civilians violates the right 
to judicial guarantees under the American Convention on Human 
Rights.13 Specifically, this type of adjudication and investigation 
violates Article 8, regarding judicial guarantees, and Article 25, 
regarding judicial protection.14 In July 2011, Mexico’s Supreme 
Court issued a resolution (“Radilla Resolution”) recognizing that the 
Military Justice Code was incompatible with Mexico’s Constitution 
and the American Convention.15 Applying this rule, the Supreme 
Court held that military tribunals should not decide cases in which 
the rights of civilians are at stake.16  
 
 10. See UNIFORM IMPUNITY, supra note 8, at 2–4 (examining the institutional 
problem of soldiers policing themselves). 
 11. See Gonzalez Perez v. Mexico, Case 11.565, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., 
Report No. 53/01, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111, doc. 20 rev. ¶ 2 (2001) (recounting that 
Mexican Armed Forces personnel arbitrarily detained, tortured, and raped three 
victims); Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 4, ¶ 119 (July 29, 1988) (relaying that Honduran soldiers kidnapped, 
tortured, and disappeared victims). 
 12. See, e.g., Cabrera Garcia v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations and Legal Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 220, ¶¶ 
187-89, 194-207 (Nov. 26, 2010) (holding that that Mexico violated American 
Convention Articles 8, 25, and 1(1) when military courts intervened in the 
preliminary investigation into alleged torture and arbitrary detention of victims and 
subjected the perpetrators to military jurisdiction). 
 13. E.g., id. ¶¶ 194-207 (establishing that military jurisdiction is not the 
competent jurisdiction to investigate, prosecute, or punish those who commit 
violations of human rights). 
 14. Id. 
 15. See Resolución Dictada por el Tribunal Pleno en el Expediente Varios 
912/2010 [Resolution of the Plenary Supreme Court on Case 912/2010], Diario 
Oficial de la Federación [DO], 4 Octubre 2011 ¶¶ 43–44 (Mex.) [hereinafter 
Radilla Resolution] (ruling that Military Justice Code Article 57, which confers 
military jurisdiction over cases involving civilians, is incompatible with the 
Constitution of Mexico). 
 16. See id. (ruling that alleged violations of human rights of civilians do not fall 
  
960 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [27:4 
The Supreme Court also held that it had original jurisdiction to 
hear cases involving military jurisdiction.17 In May 2012, the court 
announced that it had received twenty-eight cases involving military 
jurisdiction from lower courts, and ordered all lower courts to 
postpone final rulings in pending cases involving the transfer of 
human rights violations from civilian to military jurisdiction until it 
had resolved the constitutional issue in the cases before it.18 Under 
Mexico’s civil law system, the Radilla case does not itself set a 
precedent for the unconstitutionality of military jurisdiction over 
civilians, but it has opened the door to creating binding precedent by 
allowing the court to hear a series of cases on the same constitutional 
issue.19 
This Comment evaluates whether the Radilla Resolution complies 
with American Convention Articles 8 and 25 and investigates 
whether the militarization of law enforcement in Mexico is an 
obstacle to full compliance. Part II(A) introduces the concept of 
police militarization, a process that is increasingly occurring 
throughout Mexico.20 It describes the recent Radilla Resolution of the 
Mexican Supreme Court and the jurisprudence in the Inter-American 
system regarding the right to justice under Articles 1, 2, 8, and 25 of 
the American Convention.21  
 
under military jurisdiction under any circumstances); see also Mexico’s Supreme 
Court Decides to End Military Jurisdiction for Soldiers Who Commit Human 
Rights Violations, WASHINGTON OFF. ON LATIN AM. (July 13, 2011), 
http://www.wola.org/commentary/mexico_s_supreme_court_decides_to_end_milit
ary_jurisdiction_for_soldiers_who_commit_human [hereinafter WOLA] 
(describing the decision as a historic ruling); IDPC, supra note 7 (discussing that 
the Supreme Court issued the historic ruling after reviewing the 2009 Inter-
American Court decision of Radilla Pacheco). 
 17. See Radilla Resolution, supra note 15, ¶¶ 45, 55. 
 18. Acuerdo General Número 6/2012 [General Agreement Number 6/2012], 
Quinto [Part Five], Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 17 de Mayo de 2012 
(Mex.). 
 19. See Jorge Carrasco Araizaga, Corte Evita Jurisprudencia en Fuero Militar 
[Court Avoids Jurisprudrence on Military Jurisdiction], EL PROCESO (Sept. 3, 
2012), http://www.proceso.com.mx/?p=318813 (noting that in its most recent case, 
the Supreme Court failed to rule on the constitutionality of the Military Justice 
Code, missing an opportunity to progress in setting a binding precedent). 
 20. See discussion infra Part II.A (explaining that militarization is a process 
that has consequences for both law enforcement and the justice system). 
 21. See discussion infra Part II.B (discussing recent cases regarding military 
jurisdiction in the Inter-American System). 
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The Radilla Resolution, although it is a vital step toward 
compliance with American Convention Articles 8 and 25, does not 
end military jurisdiction over investigation and adjudication of 
violations committed by military personnel because it is not binding, 
but it does create a window to do so.22 Part III(B) argues that the use 
of military to fulfill both law enforcement and adjudication roles is 
an obstacle to full compliance.23 
Part IV recommends that Mexico’s Congress enact legislation that 
ends military jurisdiction for crimes against civilians.24 Mexico must 
limit its use of the military in civilian law enforcement through 
legislation.25 In addition, the United States can use foreign policy to 
pressure the Mexican government to reform its policy of 
militarization.26 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. CHARACTERISTICS AND CONSEQUENCES OF POLICE 
MILITARIZATION IN MEXICO 
The line between the armed forces and civilian public security is 
blurred,27 as many state and municipal police forces are considered 
militarized.28 In countries where this takes place, military tribunals 
 
 22. See discussion infra Part III.A (explaining the lack of legal force of the 
Radilla Resolution and Mexico’s duty to ensure the right to justice through 
effective legislation). 
 23. See discussion infra Part III.B (discussing deficiencies in investigations and 
the thousands of cases pending under military jurisdiction without progress). 
 24. See discussion infra Part IV.A (arguing that Military Justice Code Article 
57 must be amended and that legislation must protect civilians who are victims of 
military abuse and wish to prosecute). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See GEORGE WITHERS ET AL., WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AM., 
PREACH WHAT YOU PRACTICE: THE SEPARATION OF MILITARY AND POLICE ROLES 
IN THE AMERICAS 8–14 (2010) (discussing generally that in Latin America many 
countries do not have a clear delineation between the military and the police, and 
that the Mexican military in particular is deeply engaged in law enforcement). 
 28. See Mexico Replaces Police with Soldiers in Border Area (National Public 
Radio broadcast June 24, 2011) (conveying that the federal executive replaced 
entire police departments in 22 municipalities with military units); see also U.N. 
OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME [UNODC], HANDBOOK ON POLICE 
ACCOUNTABILITY, OVERSIGHT, AND INTEGRITY, at 1 n.2, U.N. Sales No. E.11.IV.5 
(2011) [hereinafter UNODC]. Militarization is the process by which police forces 
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frequently replace civilian control over the judiciary.29 This process 
occurs regardless of whether a state of war exists.30 A militarized 
police force lacks civilian accountability,31 characterized by 
monitoring of law enforcement by ministries, the judiciary, the 
legislature, and members of civil society.32 In Mexico, members of 
the military are not accountable to the state or local police, but 
instead have exclusive operations that supersede those of public 
officials.33 
Mexican military personnel differ significantly from civilian 
police forces in equipment, capabilities, and training.34 For example, 
military personnel are not trained in the collection and preservation 
of evidence.35 Soldiers frequently manipulate crime scenes, obtain 
 
become “military in style, culture and operations and sometimes in fact, when the 
police have been part of the military,” UNODC, supra, at 1 n.2. 
 29. See generally WITHERS ET AL., supra note 27, at 8–14 (noting that soldiers 
throughout many countries in Latin America are subject to a military justice 
system and mentioning Colombia’s public security as one of the most militarized); 
see also COLOM. COAL. AGAINST TORTURE, ALTERNATE REPORT TO THE 4TH 
PERIODIC REPORT OF THE COLOMBIAN STATE TO THE COMMITTEE AGAINST 
TORTURE 7 (2009), available at http://www.coljuristas.org/documentos/ 
libros_e_informes/informe_alterno_4_tortura_re_en.pdf (reporting on the use of 
the Colombian military justice system to investigate and adjudicate cases of 
torture). 
 30. Lisa Brooten, Media, Militarization, and Human Rights: Comparing Media 
Reform in the Philippines and Burma, 4 COMMUNICATION, CULTURE, & CRITIQUE 
229, 230 (2011) (noting that militarization is also a process that authorizes 
violence as a means of maintaining public order). 
 31. See UNODC, supra note 28, at 9 (advocating that a critical step to establish 
civilian oversight over the police is to demilitarize it and make sure that officers 
report to civilian— not military—authorities); COMMONWEALTH HUMAN RIGHTS 
INITIATIVE [CHRI], POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY: TOO IMPORTANT TO NEGLECT, TOO 
URGENT TO DELAY 19 (Maja Daruwala & Claire Doube eds., 2005) [hereinafter 
CHRI, POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY] (stating that civilians have control over police 
forces if those forces are directly accountable to the people they protect). 
 32. See UNODC, supra note 28, at 9 (advocating for a transparent way to hold 
police accountable so that civilian perception of the force improves). 
 33. See Marcos Moloeznik, The Militarization of Public Security and the Role 
of the Military in Mexico, in POLICE AND PUBLIC SECURITY IN MEXICO 65, 73 
(Robert A. Donelly & David A. Shirk eds., 2009) (explaining that the political 
autonomy of the armed forces is largely due to the two defense cabinet ministries 
being headed by military authorities as opposed to a political authority). 
 34. See WITHERS ET AL., supra note 27, at 3, 17 (describing the general 
differences in military and civilian police training in Latin America and 
specifically in Mexico with regard to a lack of human rights training). 
 35. See Press Conference, Special Rapporteur, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R, 
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testimony through torture, and fail to document injuries through 
appropriate medical examinations.36  
Moreover, Mexico’s police militarization is increasing.37 In 2006, 
the government installed thousands of military personnel and 
authorized them to perform domestic security duties.38 An estimated 
50,000 soldiers currently engage in counter-narcotics operations 
throughout Mexico.39 Military personnel operate highway 
checkpoints and patrol city streets and rural areas.40 Military officers 
occupy traditionally civilian law enforcement offices in twenty-one 
out of Mexico’s thirty-one states.41 A likely reason for the Calderón 
 
Conclusion of the 143 Period of Sessions (Nov. 4, 2011) (commenting on the lack 
of citizen security, and training and preparation for maintaining public order); see 
also Mexico: Deliver Justice for Killings, Disappearances in Monterrey, HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH (Feb. 3, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/02/03/mexico-
deliver-justice-killings-disappearances-monterrey (describing the failure of the 
armed forces to conduct thorough investigations, and comparing military 
personnel, who are trained to use lethal force to prevail in conflict, with civilian 
police, who are traditionally trained to use the minimum force necessary to enforce 
laws of the immediate community). 
 36. See NEITHER RIGHTS NOR SECURITY, supra note 7, at 8-19, 161 (noting that 
crime scenes are frequently tampered with to give the appearance that cartel 
members, rather than soldiers, are responsible). 
 37. See Maria de la Luz González, Crece 68% la Fuerza Militar en Seguridad 
[Military Security Force Grows 68%], EL UNIVERSAL (Sept. 17, 2011), 
http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/189027.html (relaying that the number of 
soldiers in public security roles in Mexico has increased sixty-eight percent since 
2006; soldiers are in charge of public safety units in fourteen of Mexico’s thirty-
one state police departments and are chiefs of local police in six municipalities); 
see also Luis A. Pérez & Mariana Martinez, The Militarization of Tijuana, LA 
PRENSA SAN DIEGO (Feb. 29, 2008), http://laprensa-sandiego.org/archieve/ 
2008/february29-08/militarization.htm (noting that the military budget is 
increasing at the rate of 16 percent per year and military checkpoints and convoys 
are seen frequently). 
 38. See The Mexican Military Grows 68 Percent for Security Tasks, DIÁLOGO 
(Sept. 26, 2011), http://www.dialogo-americas.com/en_GB/ articles/rmisa/features/ 
regional_news/2011/09/26/feature-ex-2553 (noting that Felipe Calderón deployed 
21,000 soldiers throughout Mexico). 
 39. See WOLA, supra note 16 (discussing the importance of the Radilla 
Resolution in relation to increasing reports of human rights violations by soldiers). 
 40. See Joe Cummings, Drugs, Rebellion, and Mexico's Militarization, 
MEXCONNECT (Jan. 1, 2006), http://www.mexconnect.com/articles/1306-drugs-
rebellion-and-mexico-s-militarization (noting that the troop size and military 
budget increased significantly since the 1990s). 
 41. See Marcelo Galan, Avanza Cambio de civiles por militares [Progress in 
Exchange of Police for Military], EL UNIVERSAL (Feb. 28, 2011), 
http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/estados/79716.html (explaining that senior armed 
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administration’s decision to increase soldiers in the public security 
sphere is public distrust of, and unpreparedness of, civilian police 
forces.42 However, while members of the administration claim that 
the presence of the military in these territories is temporary, there is 
no timeline or plan for their withdrawal or for transition to a reliable 
police force.43  
1. Consequences of Militarized Law Enforcement and Adjudication 
in Mexico 
In Mexico, military tribunals exert jurisdiction over cases 
involving crimes of torture, rape, and arbitrary detention committed 
by military personnel against civilians.44 The application of military 
jurisdiction in these cases creates an inherent conflict of interest.45 
The Mexican military justice system is not a neutral party when 
presiding over cases involving crimes committed against civilians by 
military personnel, leading to rampant impunity.46  
An unaccountable police force increases the opportunity for 
 
services officers conduct most surveillance in areas where cartels are present). 
 42. See Moloeznik, supra note 33, at 70 (conveying that a majority of 
Mexicans perceive the military positively and distrust the state and federal police 
forces; that forty-five percent believe that the military’s primary purpose should be 
crime fighting and drug trafficking; and that historically Mexico uses the military 
during national crises). 
 43. See Pérez & Martínez, supra note 37 (noting that the increasing military 
budget also demonstrates a lack of will to withdraw troops). 
 44. See UNIFORM IMPUNITY, supra note 8, at 37-62 (analyzing cases of grave 
abuses committed by soldiers brought by dozens of alleged victims). 
 45. See id. at 10 (conveying structural deficiencies of the military justice 
system and noting that there is practically no publicly available information 
regarding military tribunals); see also KRISTIN BRICKER, CTR. FOR INT’L 
GOVERNANCE, MILITARY JUSTICE AND IMPUNITY IN MEXICO’S DRUG WAR 4 
(2011), available at http://www.cigionline.org/publications/2011/9/military-
justice-and-impunity-mexicos-drug-war (noting that since 2006, few soldiers have 
been punished for human rights violations). See generally Rosendo Cantú v. 
Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Legal Costs, Judgment, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 216 (Aug. 31, 2010) (discussing the forwarding of 
Rosendo Cantú’s case to military jurisdiction and consequent impunity of 
perpetrators). 
 46. See UNIFORM IMPUNITY, supra note 8, at 10 (explaining that the Secretary 
of Defense has control over both the executive and judicial aspects of the military 
and that military personnel lack the incentive to make critical judgments for fear of 
not being promoted). 
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human rights violations.47 The implementation of an unaccountable, 
and inappropriately trained, militarized law enforcement and 
judiciary generally leads to high rates of impunity,48 discrimination, 
reduced access to justice,49 a failure to afford due process, and the 
use of brutality, torture, and extrajudicial executions.50 In Mexico, 
the increase in deployment of military personnel over the past five 
years correlates with increases in alleged human rights violations.51 
Absent a policy governing the use of force, members of the armed 
forces frequently perform warrantless searches of individuals, 
automobiles, and houses.52 Since 2006, Mexico’s National Human 
Rights Commission (CNDH) has received more than 4,800 
complaints against the military for human rights violations, 
increasing from 182 complaints in 2006 to 1,415 in 2010.53 Through 
its investigations, the CNDH has issued over forty reports 
documenting human rights violations committed by the military.54  
 
 47. See CHRI, POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 31, at 19 (advocating that 
the police are responsible for ensuring that citizens are able to enjoy fundamental 
rights); cf. WITHERS ET AL., supra note 27, at 12 (describing the use of the armed 
forces of Honduras to evict and capture the poor in land disputes, which has 
resulted in an increase in alleged human rights violations). 
 48. Press Release, U.N. Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, 
United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances 
Concludes Visit to Mexico (Mar. 31, 2011), available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10907&
LangID=E [hereinafter WGEID Press Release]. 
 49. See CHRI, POLICE PRACTICES: OBSTRUCTION TO POOR PEOPLE’S ACCESS 
TO JUSTICE 11–13 (2003) [hereinafter CHRI, POLICE PRACTICES] (describing the 
common practice of the militarized police force in India of denying the registration 
of complaints of impoverished people). 
 50. See CHRI, POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 31, at 3-8 (describing 
abuses by militarized police forces in the British Commonwealth); see also 
Brooten, supra note 30, at 230 (explaining that globally, civilians are increasingly 
victims of military abuse); ADAM ISACSON, NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 
(2004) (noting that using the military to fulfill civilian roles poses serious risks to 
human rights). 
 51. See NEITHER RIGHTS NOR SECURITY, supra note 7, at 4-5 (arguing that the 
increase in human rights abuses is a direct result of the current Mexican security 
policy). 
 52. See WGEID Press Release, supra note 48 (noting that available 
information shows that only the Ministry of the Navy and the Police of Mexico 
City have policies regarding the use of force). 
 53. WOLA, supra note 16. 
 54. See WGEID Press Release, supra note 48 (noting that these reports are 
often the only records available to demonstrate patterns of human rights violations 
as military investigative and adjudicative bodies do not release equivalent reports). 
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2. Overview of Mexican Law Regarding the Use of Military and the 
Supreme Court Radilla Resolution  
Mexico’s Constitution prohibits the use of military authority in 
many civilian matters.55 Article 13 prohibits the use of military 
tribunals in the adjudication of persons who do not belong to the 
army.56 Article 129 provides that soldiers must only execute 
operations that are directly connected to military missions.57 In 
addition, Article 1 provides that all international human rights 
treaties and norms are binding.58  
Despite these constitutional requirements, the federal executive 
continues to use the armed forces to maintain public order in Mexico, 
and prosecutors routinely send cases involving civilians and soldiers 
to military tribunals for adjudication.59 Between 1917 and 1988, the 
Supreme Court periodically issued nonbinding rulings allowing 
military jurisdiction in cases where civilians were victims of military 
abuses.60 Moreover, Article 57 of the Military Justice Code, a federal 
law, requires that crimes committed by military personnel in active 
service or related to military operations be subject to military 
jurisdiction.61 In practice, this provision ensures that allegations of 
human rights violations committed by military personnel are almost 
always subject to military jurisdiction.62 Despite the fact that the 
Constitution of Mexico vests domestic security in the municipal and 
state governments, the armed forces are authorized by the president 
 
 55. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.] [Political 
Constitution of the United Mexican States], as amended, art. 13, Diario Oficial de 
la Federación [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917, translated in Constitution of Mexico, 
ORG. OF AM. STATES, http://www.oas.org/juridico/mla/en/mex/en_mex-int-text-
const.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2011). 
 56. Id. art. 13. 
 57. Id. art. 129. 
 58. Id. art. 1. 
 59. See UNIFORM IMPUNITY, supra note 8, at 5, 9 (noting that the Attorney 
General routinely acquiesces to assertions of jurisdiction by military officials). 
 60. See id. at 5, 15 (explaining that the military has consistently asserted 
jurisdiction in cases involving allegations of grave abuses of civilians’ rights). 
 61. Código de Justicia Militar [CMJ] [Military Justice Code] art. 57(II)(A), 
Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 31 de Agosto de 1933 (Mex.). 
 62. See UNIFORM IMPUNITY, supra note 8, at 5, 13 (explaining that in practice, 
the Attorney General of Mexico has automatically sent all cases involving crimes 
committed by the military to the Military Justice Attorney General). 
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to maintain order over rural areas.63 
A decision by the Mexican Supreme Court may impact the use of 
military jurisdiction, but to create jurisprudence on a legal or 
constitutional issue, the Supreme Court must issue five uninterrupted 
and consistent decisions on the issue.64 The Radilla Resolution 
announces that members of the military accused of any human rights 
violation must be tried in civilian courts.65 The ruling came after 
consideration of a 2009 decision by the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights regarding the forced disappearance of human rights 
defender Rosendo Radilla in 1974 by Mexican soldiers.66  
The Radilla Resolution holds that: (1) Article 1 of Mexico’s 
Constitution requires all judges in Mexico to adhere to international 
human rights treaties, adopting an interpretation most favorable to 
human rights,67 (2) decisions of the IACtHR in which Mexico is a 
party are binding and others are informative or guiding,68 (3) the 
Supreme Court has original jurisdiction disputes between military 
and civilian courts,69 (4) Military Justice Code Article 57 is 
 
 63. See Raúl Benítez, The Urgent Need for Reform in Security Policy, in 1 
WOODROW WILSON CENTER REPORTS ON THE AMERICAS, MEXICO IN TRANSITION 
42 (Andrew D. Selee ed., 2001) (conveying that this is due to an institutional 
structure in which legal initiatives are presented by the president and largely 
unchecked by legislative mechanisms). 
 64. See Radilla Resolution, supra note 15, ¶¶ 43–44 (holding that adjudication 
of cases involving civilians in military tribunals violates the Constitution and 
international law). But see JORGE A. VARGAS, MEXICAN LAW FOR THE AMERICAN 
LAWYER 18–21 (2009) (explaining that Mexico belongs to the civil legal tradition 
and thus does not abide by the principle of stare decisis and explaining that under 
the Federal Amparo Act, jurisprudence is created after five consecutive and 
uninterrupted decisions approved by an identically-constituted court). See also 
FRANCISCO A. AVALOS, INTRODUCTION TO THE MEXICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 13 (2d. 
ed. 2000) (describing that binding Supreme Court jurisprudence is established only 
after five consecutive and consistent rulings on a legal issue, and the high value of 
codified law within Mexico’s civil law system). 
 65. See Radilla Resolution, supra note 15, ¶¶ 43-44 (stating that military 
jurisdiction cannot operate under any situation involving the vulnerability of 
human rights of civilians). 
 66. See id. ¶ 37 (recognizing that the IACtHR ordered the state of Mexico to 
adopt certain measures). 
 67. See id. ¶ 27 (establishing a system of interpretation and application as 
required by IACtHR decisions). 
 68. See id. ¶ 31 (developing an analytical framework for lower courts to 
follow). 
 69. See id. ¶¶ 45, 55 (ordering all federal courts and tribunals to inform the 
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incompatible with Article 13 of the Constitution and Articles 2 and 
8(1) of the American Convention,70 and (4) once an investigation is 
filed it cannot be removed to military jurisdiction.71 This aspect of 
the Radilla Resolution only applies to future cases; thus, pending 
cases in military jurisdiction require an injunction to be filed in 
civilian court in order to have their cases removed.72 The Mexican 
Congress has yet to pass a legislative reform that complies with the 
Supreme Court’s ruling.73  
B. THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM AND ITS JURISPRUDENCE 
REGARDING THE RIGHT TO JUSTICE IN RELATION TO 
MILITARIZATION 
The standards of the Inter-American system are enshrined in two 
multilateral treaties: the American Declaration on the Rights and 
Duties of Man of 1948 and the American Convention on Human 
Rights of 1969.74 The American Convention on Human Rights 
 
Supreme Court when a related situation arises so that it may assert original 
jurisdiction in the matter). 
 70. See id. ¶¶ 43-44 (explaining that article 57 is incompatible with article 1 of 
the Mexican Constitution and articles 2 and 8(1) of the American Convention 
because to establish that crimes committed by the military are subject to military 
jurisdiction does not guarantee to civilians or their families the opportunity to 
come before a judge in an ordinary jurisdiction); see also Código de Justicia 
Militar [CMJ] [Military Justice Code] art. 57(II)(A), Diario Oficial de la 
Federación [DO], 31 de Agosto de 1933 (Mex.) (defining crimes within military 
jurisdiction as those committed by soldiers in times of service or with a military 
motive).  
 71. See Radilla Resolution, supra note 15, ¶ 50. 
 72. See id. ¶ 45 (noting that the ruling should be applied in all future cases); see 
also BRICKER, supra note 45, at 7 (arguing that the resolution is a temporary 
solution and that Mexico can only be in compliance once the Military Justice Code 
is modified). 
 73. See BRICKER, supra note 45, at 8–9 (discussing proposals to modify the 
Military Justice Code); see also Gloria Leticia Díaz, “Usted Disculpe”, Dice 
Gobierno a Indígena Violada por Militares Hace Nueve Años [Government says 
“We Apologize to You” to an Indigenous Woman Raped Nine Years Ago], 
PROCESO.COM.MX (Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.proceso.com.mx/?p= 291519 
(reporting that on December 9, 2011, the president contacted legislators requesting 
reform of Article 57 to conform to the IACtHR decisions). 
 74. See HENRY J. STEINER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
CONTEXT: LAW POLITICS AND MORALS 1020, 1025 (3d ed. 2007) (discussing the 
two intergovernmental bodies that supervise state compliance with the American 
Convention: the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) and the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR)). 
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(“American Convention”) vests the application and interpretation of 
the American Convention on Human Rights and other treaties 
concerning human rights with the IACtHR.75 Mexico has ratified the 
American Convention and recognized as binding the adjudicatory 
jurisdiction of the IACtHR on matters relating to the interpretation or 
application of the American Convention on Human Rights.76 The 
Right to Justice, under Articles 1(1), 2, 8, and 25, of the American 
Convention, has been developed extensively in the jurisprudence of 
the IACtHR over the past decade.77  
1. Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention  
American Convention Article 8 encompasses due process rights 
under the American Convention.78 These include guarantees to 
adjudication within a reasonable time by a competent and neutral 
court.79 Article 25 guarantees the right to judicial protection.80  
 
 75. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights 
arts. 52–65, Nov. 22, 1969, 1969 O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 
[hereinafter American Convention]; see also INTER-AM. COURT OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS, http://www.corteidh.or.cr/historia.cfm?&CFID=230260&CFTOKEN= 
89785735 (last visited Mar. 21, 2012) (stating that the American Convention is a 
multilateral treaty that was signed in 1969 and entered into force in July of 1978). 
 76. See Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.] [Political 
Constitution of the United Mexican States], as amended, art. 1, Diario Oficial de la 
Federación [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (guaranteeing that all people of Mexico 
enjoy the human rights recognized in the Mexican Constitution and treaties to 
which Mexico is a party); see also American Convention, supra note 75, arts. 44–
50 (describing the procedure and competence of the IACHR to hear matters 
concerning violations of the American Convention). 
 77. See Richard J. Wilson & Jan Perlin, The Inter-American Human Rights 
System: Activities from Late 2000 Through October 2002, 18 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 
651, 653–700 (providing an overview of recent cases before the IACtHR in which 
Articles 1, 2, 8 and 25 were applied); see also STEINER ET AL., supra note 74, at 
433 (noting that the IACHR opposes the use of military courts in matters where 
there are civilian parties even in the context of maintaining national security). 
 78. See generally Rosendo Cantú v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 216, ¶¶ 72-75, 
161 (Aug. 31 2010) (holding that Mexico violated Articles 8 and 25 when the case 
of soldiers torturing and gang raping Rosendo Cantú was transferred to military 
jurisdiction). 
 79. American Convention, supra note 75, art. 8 (establishing that such court 
must be previously established by law). 
 80. See id. art. 25 (“[e]veryone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or 
any other effective recourse, to a competent court or tribunal . . . even though such 
violation may have been committed by persons acting in the course of their official 
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The IACtHR and the IACHR have repeatedly affirmed that 
military tribunals and investigations are unacceptable under Articles 
8 and 25.81 Such tribunals are regarded as a violation of the 
“Principle of the Competent Court.”82 The IACtHR examines “the 
nature of the crime and the juridical right damaged” to determine 
whether a court is competent.83 A military tribunal is only competent 
when presiding over crimes that are military in nature and in which 
military rights are infringed.84 Impartiality and independence are also 
essential factors in determining whether due process rights are 
protected.85  
The IACtHR also decides whether the investigations into alleged 
crimes are in accordance with the “principle of effectiveness.”86 
 
duties.”). 
 81. See, e.g., Gonzalez Perez v. Mexico, Case 11.565, Inter-Am. Comm’n 
H.R., Report No. 53/01, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111, doc. 20 rev. ¶ 4 (2001) (concluding 
that the Mexican state violated articles 8 and 25 when the Attorney General 
transferred the preliminary investigation of an alleged rape and torture by soldiers 
to the PGJR); Bolaños Quiñones v. Ecuador, Case 10.580, Inter-Am. Comm’n 
H.R., Report No. 10/95, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.91, doc. 7, ¶¶ 42-48 (1996) (finding that 
Ecuador violated Articles 8 and 25 when the investigation was carried out by 
Naval Intelligence agents when marines detained and forcibly disappeared Bolaños 
Quiñonez). 
 82. See, e.g., Radilla-Pacheco v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 209, ¶ 266 
(Nov. 23, 2009) (discussing the principle of the competent court as linked to due 
process under articles 8 and 25); Cabrera Garcia v. Mexico, Preliminary 
Objections, Merits, Reparations and Legal Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 220, ¶¶ 194-201 (Nov. 26, 2010) (declaring that Mexico violated 
article 8 because a deficient investigation inevitably results in an incompetent 
tribunal). 
 83. See, e.g., Rosendo Cantú v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations and Legal Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 216, ¶ 161 
(Aug. 31, 2010) (conveying that the nature of the crime was gang rape and did not 
relate to the military mission); Radilla-Pacheco, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 
209, ¶ 277 (describing that the nature of the crime was arbitrary detention and did 
not impact military rights). 
 84. See Radilla-Pacheco, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 209, ¶ 273 (noting 
that if human rights such as the right to life are infringed, then ordinary courts are 
the only competent courts to investigate and prosecute). 
 85. See Bolaños Quiñones, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 10/95 (noting 
that impartiality and independence are compromised when judicial proceedings are 
conducted by bodies involved in the crimes). 
 86. Radilla-Pacheco, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 209, ¶ 201 (observing 
that state response, an aspect of the principle of effectiveness, must entail a serious 
and impartial investigation). 
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Investigations, similar to trials, must be impartial to be considered 
effective.87 In addition, there must be an adequate state response that 
includes a diligent investigation, conducted ex officio and within a 
reasonable period of time.88 An ex officio investigation requires 
immediate action by government officials without petitioning from 
victims or their families.89 The state is required to provide necessary 
technological and pedagogical resources to initiate the ex officio 
investigation.90 A reasonable period of time for the government to 
initiate an investigation is determined by the complexity of the 
crime.91 
 
 87. See Lacayo v. Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 30, ¶ 80 (Jan. 29, 1997) (affirming that a military 
criminal law, which did not require military witnesses to appear to testify, 
prevented any impartial investigation that could lead to the prosecution of 
offenders); see also Cabrera Garcia v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations and Legal Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 220, ¶¶ 
198-202 (Nov. 26, 2010) (noting that military investigations into crimes committed 
by the military against civilians are per se ineffective). 
 88. See, e.g., Radilla-Pacheco v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 209, ¶¶ 201, 
245 (Nov. 23, 2009) (concluding that a preliminary inquiry that remained open 
more than seven years after the Special Prosecutors’ Office began investigation, 
and seventeen years after the cabinet authority was made aware of the 
disappearance, was unreasonable); Bulacio v. Argentina, Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 100, ¶ 114 (Sept. 18, 2003) 
(holding that articles 8 and 25 were violated when a court case regarding injuries 
to, detention, and death of Bulacio was still not resolved after ten years); Lacayo, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 30, ¶ 80 (affirming that two years accrued after 
submission of petition for judicial review is unreasonable). 
 89. See Cabrera Garcia v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations 
and Legal Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 220, ¶ 193 (Nov. 26, 
2010) (holding that the state failed to conduct an ex officio investigation when the 
government initiated the investigation three months after learning of the torture 
and only upon the express requests of petitioners). 
 90. See Radilla-Pacheco, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 209, ¶ 222 
(discussing what is necessary to constitute due diligence in an investigation of a 
forced disappearance). 
 91. See id. ¶ 244 (explaining that the complexity of the case, procedural steps 
taken by the victim and actions taken by judicial authorities must be taken into 
account to determine timeliness); under the requirements in article 8(1) of the 
American Convention); see also Maia Fernandes v. Brazil, Case 12.051, Inter-Am. 
Comm’n H.R., Report No. 54/01, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111, doc. 20 rev. (2000) 
(holding that an eight-year delay alone in obtaining the first conviction constituted 
a denial of rights under articles 8 and 25). 
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2. Articles 1 and 2 of the American Convention 
Article 1(1) of the American Convention imposes a “duty to 
ensure” on States, which requires them to take affirmative measures 
to guarantee rights in the treaty.92 Article 2 requires States to adopt 
legislation or other provisions to ensure compliance with the other 
articles of the American Convention.93 
In Radilla-Pacheco v. Mexico, involving the arbitrary arrest and 
subsequent forced disappearance of the petitioner,94 the IACtHR held 
that the state violated its obligation under American Convention 
Article 1(1) to offer effective judicial recourse to alleged victims of 
human rights abuses under Article 25, pursuant to due process of law 
under Article 8.95 The IACtHR determined that the state failed to 
perform a diligent investigation within a reasonable period of time.96 
Thus both the IACtHR and the IACHR have interpreted Articles 8 
and 25 to place a duty on the state through Articles 1 and 2 to 
diligently and effectively investigate and adjudicate crimes and to 
adopt legislation or other provisions that ensure these processes.97  
 
 92. See American Convention, supra note 75, art. 1(1) (“The States Parties to 
this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein 
and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of 
those rights and freedoms. . . ”) (emphasis added). 
 93. See American Convention, supra note 75, art. 2 (“States Parties undertake 
to adopt, in accordance with their constitutional processes and the provisions of 
this Convention, such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give 
effect to those rights or freedoms.”); see also González v. Mexico, Preliminary 
Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
No. 205, ¶ 287 (Nov. 16, 2009) (affirming that the duty to investigate arises from 
the obligation to ensure fulfillment of other rights enshrined in the American 
Convention). 
 94. See Radilla-Pacheco v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 209, ¶¶ 122, 
173-314 (Nov. 23, 2009) (concluding that the motive for Radilla Pacheco’s 
abduction was his composition of a popular Mexican folk song whose verses 
illustrate peasant social battles that occurred in Atoyac de Álvarez). 
 95. Id. ¶¶ 190-91 (noting that a delay in determining the basic facts of an 
investigation can in itself be a violation of due process guarantees under the 
American Convention). 
 96. Id. ¶ 245. 
 97. See id. ¶ 247 (describing the positive duty of states to adopt or adjust legal 
provisions, including constitutional text, to ensure compliance with the American 
Convention); see also Maia Fernandes v. Brazil, Case 12.051, Inter-Am. Comm’n 
H.R., Report No. 54/01, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111, doc. 20 rev., ¶¶ 85-87 (2000) (noting 
that the IACHR holds the view that a state has failed its obligations under the 
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III.ANALYSIS 
While the Radilla Resolution brings Mexico closer to compliance 
with the Right to Justice under the American Convention, it is 
deficient because it is undermined by Military Justice Code Article 
57’s existence and application.98 Moreover, the ruling fails to address 
aspects of militarization other than the justice system.99 If lower 
civilian courts and military courts follow the Radilla Resolution, 
Mexico will be in compliance with the principle of the competent 
court under IACtHR jurisprudence.100 However, it is unlikely that 
most lower courts and military courts will follow a nonbinding 
decision.101 Without legal force, Military Justice Code Article 57 
preempts the Radilla Resolution.102 That provision will allow military 
tribunals and investigations to continue to be applied in cases 
involving the commission of crimes by military personnel against 
civilians.103 Even under the Radilla Resolution, military authorities 
can conduct investigations prior to the filing of a complaint in 
civilian court.104 
 
American Convention when its structures and processes proscribed by law fail to 
ensure the “full and fair exercise of human rights”). 
 98. See Código de Justicia Militar [CMJ] [Military Justice Code] art. 57(II), 
Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 31 de Agosto de 1933 (Mex.) (permitting 
military tribunals to oversee cases in which crimes are committed by active 
soldiers or during a military operation); see also Radilla-Pacheco, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 209, ¶ 342 (holding that Article 57 is incompatible with the 
American Convention); BRICKER, supra note 45, at 8 (referring to the Radilla 
Resolution as a “stopgap” measure until article 57 is reformed). 
 99. See generally Radilla Resolution, supra note 15 (addressing the 
competence of civilian courts for adjudication and investigation only after a formal 
complaint is filed in a federal court). 
 100. See American Convention, supra note 75, art. 2 (permitting Mexico to 
adopt “such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to” 
articles 8 and 25) (emphasis added); AVALOS, supra note 64, at 13-14 (noting the 
nonbinding nature of a solitary Supreme Court administrative ruling). 
 101. See American Convention, supra note 75, art. 2 (requiring an effective 
legal provision that ensures the fulfillment of other rights of the American 
Convention). But see Juzgado Sexto de Distrito del Centro Auxiliar de la Segunda 
Región, Dec. 2, 2011, Amparo 818/2011, ¶ 60-67 (holding that article 57 is 
unconstitutional and contrary to the American Convention). 
 102. See AVALOS, supra note 64, at 13-14 (conveying the emphasis placed on 
code over court decisions). 
 103. Id. 
 104. See Radilla Resolution, supra note 15, ¶ 50 (holding that once complaints 
are filed they cannot be transferred to military jurisdiction). 
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Moreover, the policy of replacing civilian police forces with 
military personnel impedes the conduct of an effective investigation 
as required under the American Convention because of the latter’s 
lack of training and proper equipment.105 Finally, the Radilla 
Resolution does not apply retroactively.106 Cases of human rights 
abuse committed by the military that remain under military 
jurisdiction are likely violations of the principle of “sufficient state 
response” because cases must be addressed within a reasonable time 
and ex officio.107  
A. THE RADILLA RESOLUTION ENCOURAGES COURTS TO APPLY 
CIVILIAN JURISDICTION TO CASES, BUT FAILS TO ENSURE 
PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO JUSTICE  
If followed, Mexico would be closer to compliance with the 
principle of the competent court because lower courts would be 
prohibited from transferring cases to military prosecutors.108 
However, American Convention Article 2 requires Mexico to adopt 
legislation or other provisions that are effective in ensuring the rights 
enshrined in the American Convention.109 The Radilla Resolution is 
not binding on lower courts or military courts to the extent that it 
holds Military Justice Code Article 57 unconstitutional.110 Because 
Mexico has failed to adopt effective provisions that ensure the right 
to justice, Mexico remains in violation of the American 
Convention.111  
 
 105. See NEITHER RIGHTS NOR SECURITY, supra note 7, at 16 (discussing the 
greatest obstacles to effective investigations and prosecutions, including the 
propensity of security forces to contaminate and manipulate crime scenes). 
 106. See Radilla Resolution, supra note 15, ¶ 45 (affirming that the resolution 
applies to future cases). 
 107. See BRICKER, supra note 45, at 8 (noting the failure of the Radilla 
Resolution to apply to cases currently under military investigation). 
 108. See Radilla Resolution, supra note 15, ¶ 50 (holding that complaints cannot 
be transferred to military jurisdiction). 
 109. See Radilla-Pacheco v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 209, ¶ 288 
(Nov. 23, 2009) (remarking that the requirement of effectiveness is referred to as 
the “principle of effet útil”). 
 110. See AVALOS, supra note 64, at 13-14. But see Jorge Carrasco Araizaga 
supra note 19 (noting that the decision permitted the court to receive almost thirty 
cases related to military jurisdiction by asserting original jurisdiction). 
 111. See American Convention, supra note 75, art. 2 (requiring effective 
legislation necessary to ensure the rights and freedoms enumerated in the 
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1. The Radilla Resolution Upholds the “Principle of the Competent 
Court” 
The Radilla Resolution brings Mexico closer to compliance with 
the American Convention because it holds that Article 57 of the 
Military Justice Code is incompatible with Article 13 of Mexico’s 
Constitution and the American Convention.112 It also holds that under 
no circumstances can military jurisdiction operate in situations 
implicating one’s civil human rights.113 These holdings are in 
accordance with the competent court principle of IACtHR 
jurisprudence.114 The Radilla Resolution took into account the Inter-
American Court decision of Radilla-Pacheco, which held that 
military jurisdiction over crimes involving civilians is incompatible 
with the articles of the American Convention pertaining to the Right 
to Justice.115 The “principle of the competent court” is a key element 
of due process under Articles 8 and 25.116 To determine whether a 
court is competent, “the nature of the crime and the juridical right 
damaged” must be taken into account.117 A military tribunal is only a 
 
American Convention). 
 112. See Radilla Resolution, supra note 15, ¶ 43 (holding that Military Justice 
Code Article 57 is unconstitutional and incompatible with the American 
Convention). 
 113. See id. ¶¶ 43-44 (establishing that civilian authorities must have unique 
jurisdiction over cases filed in federal courts). 
 114. See id. ¶ 43 (explaining that establishing violations of human rights as 
offenses against the military discipline does not allow victims or their families to 
come before a civilian judge or court). 
 115. See Radilla-Pacheco v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 209, ¶ 272 
(Nov. 23, 2009) (noting that the IACtHR has consistently held that in democratic 
states in times of peace, the competence of military criminal jurisdiction is limited 
to protecting military rights related to military operations). 
 116. See id. ¶ 266 (noting that the IACHR stated that the military justice system 
in Mexico does not satisfy the principle of the competent court). 
 117. See, e.g., Cabrera Garcia v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations and Legal Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 220, ¶ 187 
(Nov. 26, 2010) (considering the IACHR’s conclusions that torture is not related to 
the military discipline or its mission and that the investigation into torture 
allegations should have been conducted by the regular courts); Rosendo Cantú v. 
Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Legal Costs, Judgment, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 216, ¶ 161 (Aug. 31, 2010) (relaying that gang rape 
did not damage military juridical interests); Radilla-Pacheco, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 209, ¶ 277 (reasoning that an arbitrary detention and forced 
disappearance violated rights under articles 8 and 25 and were not military in 
  
976 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [27:4 
competent court when the nature of the crime is a military one and 
military rights are infringed.118 Ordinary courts have jurisdiction over 
soldiers who commit human rights abuses against civilians because 
those crimes do not impact military rights and are not furthering a 
military mission.119  
The Supreme Court’s ruling complies with the holdings of the 
Inter-American Court because it requires that all cases in which 
human rights are violated by military personnel shall be tried in 
civilian courts.120 In addition to these crimes being outside of the 
military realm, military personnel are not impartial or independent 
actors.121 A military tribunal arbitrating a human rights violation 
committed by a soldier cannot be impartial because it is “sitting in 
judgment of itself.”122 Furthermore, the military lacks independence 
because it answers to the Secretary of Defense and would not want to 
issue an unfavorable ruling.123  
There is evidence that the Radilla Resolution has had an impact as 
military courts have subsequently decided to transfer cases to the 
 
nature). 
 118. Radilla-Pacheco, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 209, ¶ 313 (holding that 
the principle of the competent court was violated by extending military jurisdiction 
to crimes outside of military activities). 
 119. See id. ¶¶ 274, 277 (noting that military jurisdiction cannot be applied to 
situations involving the forced disappearances and other violations of human rights 
of civilians because that is not “a legitimate and acceptable means for compliance 
with military missions.”). 
 120. See Radilla Resolution, supra note 15, ¶¶ 43-44 (holding that Military 
Justice Code Article 57 is incompatible with Article 13 because it requires military 
courts to adjudicate cases involving soldiers violating the human rights of 
civilians). 
 121. See UNIFORM IMPUNITY, supra note 8, at 10 (arguing that the structure of 
the armed forces and the military justice system does not allow the armed forces to 
act impartially or independently); see also Mexico: Nine Years Later, Cases of 
Indigenous Women Raped and Tortured by Soldiers are Transferred out of 
Military Jurisdiction, ROBERT F. KENNEDY CTR. FOR JUST. & HUM. RTS. (Aug. 17, 
2011), http://rfkcenter.org/mexico-nine-years-later-cases-of-indigenous-women-
raped-and-tortured-by-soldiers-are-transferred-out-of-military-jurisdiction 
[hereinafter ROBERT F. KENNEDY CTR.] (“The military is not an impartial actor.”) 
(statement of Robert F. Kennedy Center President Kerry Kennedy). 
 122. UNIFORM IMPUNITY, supra note 8, at 10. 
 123. See id. (noting that military judges, for job security reasons, will not issue 
an unfavorable ruling against the military because the Secretary of Defense has 
both executive and judicial power over military judges). 
  
2012] BURYING THE RIGHT TO JUSTICE 977 
federal Attorney General.124 Nine years after the alleged crimes were 
committed, the Military Justice Attorney General (“PGJM”) moved 
two petitioners’ cases to a civilian court.125 The timing of the removal 
is further evidence that the Radilla Resolution is persuasive in the 
military sphere to apply international due process requirements.126 As 
further evidence of its impact, the Supreme Court cites to the Radilla 
Resolution in its administrative order staying cases involving 
military jurisdiction in lower courts.127  
2. Mexico Remains in Violation of Articles 8 and 25 Because the 
Radilla Resolution Is Trumped by Conflicting Legislation  
The Radilla Resolution does not require that Mexico modify its 
laws because it is the first ruling on the constitutionality of Military 
Justice Code Article 57.128 Nevertheless, the court has announced 
that by way of this ruling it is asserting original jurisdiction over 
more than twenty cases involving alleged military abuse, which 
presents an opportunity to amend or invalidate the code.129 American 
Convention Articles 2, 8, and 25 require Mexico to adopt effective 
legislation or provisions that compel a competent court to adjudicate 
cases.130 In order to comply, the state must adopt legislation that 
conforms to the principle of the competent court.131 This legislation 
 
 124. See ROBERT F. KENNEDY CTR., supra note 121 (reporting that in August 
2011 the PGJM relinquished jurisdiction in two cases involving women raped by 
soldiers in 2002). 
 125. See id. (advocating that the two cases that were transferred illustrate the 
need for increased civilian control over Mexico’s military). 
 126. See id. (asserting that the PGJM’s notification of removal acknowledged 
that the military lacked jurisdiction to hear the two cases involving human rights 
abuses committed by the military). 
 127. Acuerdo General Número 6/2012 [General Agreement Number 6/2012], 
Quinto [Part Five], Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 17 de Mayo de 2012 
(Mex.). 
 128. See AVALOS, supra note 64, at 13 (noting that binding jurisprudence is 
created through five consecutive decisions on a legal matter). 
 129. Acuerdo General Número 6/2012 [General Agreement Number 6/2012], 
Quinto [Part Five], Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 17 de Mayo de 2012 
(Mex.). 
 130. See American Convention, supra note 75, art. 2 (requiring legislation or 
other measures that give effect to rights in the American Convention). 
 131. See Radilla-Pacheco v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 209, ¶ 342 
(Nov. 23, 2009) (requiring the State to enact legislative modifications to make 
article 57 compatible with the American Convention). 
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must give effect to the principle that civilian courts are the only 
courts that can preside over cases in which neither the nature of the 
crime nor the right damaged are of a military character.132  
The Radilla Resolution holds that Article 57 of the Military Justice 
Code is incompatible with the Mexican Constitution and 
international law, but this does not render the Military Justice Code 
invalid because it is not binding jurisprudence.133 Under Mexico’s 
civil law system, the federal code supersedes Supreme Court 
decisions.134  
Without binding jurisprudence invalidating Military Justice Code 
Article 57, American Convention Article 2 requires modification of 
the Military Justice Code because Article 57 does not uphold the 
principle of the competent court either in form or in practice.135 In 
general, the PGJM does not comply with the Radilla Resolution and 
continues to apply Military Justice Code Article 57.136 The latter 
remains incompatible with international law because it conflicts with 
the principle of the competent court.137 The provision allows all cases 
 
 132. See id. ¶ 288 (noting that there is an obligation for the State to adjust or 
adopt domestic legislation in order to guarantee the rights enshrined in the 
American Convention and inferring that such legislation must be effective). 
 133. See AVALOS, supra note 64, at 13-14 (suggesting that without five 
consecutive decisions the ruling is little more than persuasive). 
 134. Id. 
 135. See American Convention, supra note 75, at art. 2 (requiring parties to the 
Convention to adopt legislation giving effect to rights protected by the 
Convention); see also Garrido v. Argentina, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 39, ¶ 68 (Aug. 27, 1998) (recognizing the 
“universally valid” principle of customary international law that parties to 
international agreements must alter domestic law to ensure compliance with treaty 
obligations); Jorge Carrasco Araizaga, Militares sin fuero: decision tardía e 
insuficiente [Soldiers without Jurisdiction: Decision too Late and too Little], 
PROCESO.COM.MX (July 16, 2011), http://www.proceso.com.mx/?p=276090 
(arguing that the decision does not subject the military court to civilian jurisdiction 
and that an attorney litigating for the armed forces will deny civilian court 
competence over the cases). 
 136. See BRICKER, supra note 45, at 8 (describing the Radilla Resolution as a 
“stop-gap” until the legislature enacts laws repealing article 57, while noting that 
such legislation has not yet been passed); see also AVALOS, supra note 64, at 12-13 
(describing Mexico’s civil law tradition, which places a higher value on codes than 
court decisions). 
 137. See Código de Justicia Militar [CMJ] [Military Justice Code] art. 57(II)(A), 
Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 31 de Agosto de 1933 (Mex.) (upholding the 
use of military jurisdiction in crimes committed by active soldiers or during a 
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of violations by military personnel against civilians to be subject to 
military tribunals regardless of the nature of the crime and the rights 
damaged.138 Thus despite the Radilla Resolution, by failing to modify 
or override this law, Mexico continues to be in violation of Article 2, 
and thereby Articles 8 and 25.139 
B. THE RADILLA RESOLUTION, EVEN IF IT WERE BINDING, DOES 
NOT TRANSFER PENDING CASES UNDER MILITARY JURISDICTION 
TO CIVILIAN COURTS OR REQUIRE ADEQUATE INVESTIGATIONS  
The Radilla Resolution does not apply retroactively, so competent 
authorities are not investigating thousands of cases of human rights 
abuse committed by the military that are still pending.140 The failure 
to effectively investigate these cases within a reasonable time 
constitutes an insufficient state response.141 A sufficient state 
response requires an ex officio, diligent, and impartial investigation 
within a reasonable period of time.142 Furthermore, the policy of 
militarizing police forces is an obstacle to achieving a sufficient state 
response because soldiers rarely perform effective investigations.143  
 
military operation). 
 138. See Abel Barrera Hernández, Restricción del Fuero Militar: Triunfo de 
Víctimas y Sociedad Civil [Military Jurisdiction Limitation: Victory for Victims 
and Civil Society], CONTRALÍNEA (Aug. 7, 2011), http://contralinea.info/archivo-
revista/index.php/2011/ 08/07/restriccion-del-fuero-militar-triunfo-de-victimas-y-
sociedad-civil (arguing that military jurisdiction is incompatible with the American 
Convention and arguing for increased civilian control over public security). 
 139. See Radilla-Pacheco v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 209, ¶¶ 288-89 
(Nov. 23, 2009) (concluding that as long as Mexico continues to extend military 
jurisdiction to crimes that are not characteristic of the military realm or in 
connection to the military discipline, it is violating Articles 2, 8 and 25 of the 
American Convention). 
 140. See Radilla-Pacheco, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 209, ¶ 201 (noting 
that sufficient state response is a decisive aspect of fulfillment of articles 8 and 25). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Cabrera Garcia v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and 
Legal Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 220, ¶ 215 (Nov. 26, 2010) 
(ordering investigation of the facts within a reasonable period of time); Radilla-
Pacheco, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 209, (holding that the failure to carry out 
an immediate investigation in the case of a forced disappearance and a total of 
seventeen years without a reasonable delay in investigation constituted an 
unreasonable period of time). 
 143. See NEITHER RIGHTS NOR SECURITY, supra note 7, at 16 (describing 
evidentiary problems common to investigations by security forces, including 
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1. Militarization of Law Enforcement Leads to Insufficient State 
Response as Complaints Are Not Addressed Within a Reasonable 
Period of Time and Ex Officio 
To date, there remains a long backlog of cases pending in military 
tribunals, accumulating since at least 2006.144 Mexico is violating 
Articles 8 and 25 by failing to adequately respond, evidenced by the 
elapsed time taken to address these cases.145 The Inter-American 
Court has established that the State has the obligation to protect the 
right to a fair trial, which requires diligent and effective investigation 
within a reasonable period of time.146 Failure to act within such a 
time frame constitutes a lack of a state response, which is a decisive 
element in assessing if there has been compliance with Articles 8 and 
25 of the American Convention.147 The IACtHR analyzes the state 
response by determining whether the facts under investigation and 
the corresponding criminal responsibilities are made effective within 
a reasonable time.148 This is determined on a case-by-case basis that 
 
evidence tampering and contamination and the acquiring of confessions through 
violence and coercion). 
 144. See id. at 10-11 (reporting that the PGJM refuses to open many cases, and 
that of the over 3,500 cases opened since 2007 many remain pending with little 
progress toward any result, in part because of delay tactics used by prosecutors 
who either believe that they have no chance of prevailing in the military system or 
who are openly colluding with the military). 
 145. See Lacayo v. Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 30, ¶¶ 74–89 (Jan. 29, 1997) (recognizing that article 8’s 
procedural due process guarantees include the right to a hearing within a 
“reasonable time,” and that Article 25 guarantees “prompt recourse for protection” 
of victims of human rights violations where the victim seeks such recourse). 
 146. See Bulacio v. Argentina, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 100, ¶ 114–15, 119 (Sept. 18, 2003) (recognizing 
Mexico’s admitted violations of article 8’s fair trial guarantee and Article 25’s 
right to judicial protection — which encompasses Article 8’s due process 
protections — where delays in the investigation of injuries, detention, and death of 
Bulacio led to a failure to prosecute over twelve years after violations occurred). 
 147. See Radilla-Pacheco v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 209, ¶ 191 
(Nov. 23, 2009) (analyzing the due diligence of the investigation). 
 148. See id. (holding that the state violated the Right to Justice where it received 
a formal communication of the facts and did not immediately start a 
comprehensive investigation); see also, e.g., Lacayo, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
No. 30, ¶ 80 (holding that the government violated article 8 where the death of the 
victim involved extensive investigation making it complex, victim's father did not 
obstruct process by following established procedure, application for judicial review 
took two years to process, and more than five years elapsed from court order to the 
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takes into account factors such as complexity of the crime and 
behavior of judicial authorities.149  
During Calderón’s administration, over 5,000 complaints against 
military personnel were filed.150 Although it is unclear whether the 
military tribunals and other governmental bodies involved will give 
effect to the Radilla Resolution, most cases involving military crimes 
against civilians prior to this decision were either dismissed or sent 
to military jurisdiction.151 Between December 2006 and June 2010, 
federal and local public prosecutors sent 1,661 cases in which 
soldiers committed crimes against civilians to military courts.152 
Cases are rarely transferred from military to civilian jurisdiction, and 
when they are, parties seeking transfer must overcome many 
procedural and bureaucratic obstacles.153  
Due to the severe lack of transparency of the military justice 
system, it is uncertain what the nature of the majority of these cases 
is in order to determine their complexity.154 However, alleged cases 
 
initiate proceeding). 
 149. See Lacayo, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 30, ¶ 77 (adopting the three 
factor analysis used by the European Court of Human Rights in interpreting 
“reasonable time” under the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which includes considering the “judicial 
activity of the interested party” in addition to complexity and judicial behavior); 
Maia Fernandes v. Brazil, Case 12.051, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 
54/01, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111, doc. 20 rev., ¶ 39-40, 44 (2000) (noting that 
“reasonable time” is determined on a case-by-case basis and finding that Brazil 
violated articles 8 and 25 where seventeen years passed without a final decision 
being issued in an attempted murder investigation, including an eight year period 
between the crime’s commission and the commencement of investigations). 
 150. See BRICKER, supra note 45, at 3–45 (noting that complaints of 
government-perpetrated human rights violations filed with the CNDH increased 
twenty-six percent since 2006, and that between 2006 and 2011, 5,055 alleged 
violations had been filed against military officials). 
 151. Id. (describing how prosecutors feel compelled by the CMJ to turn cases 
involving active military personnel over to military jurisdiction, and that where 
such cases do reach civilian courts, judges often dismiss them or send them to 
military courts). 
 152. Id. 
 153. See ROBERT F. KENNEDY CTR., supra note 121 (describing the recent 
decision of PGJM prosecutors to transfer the cases of two women to civilian 
courts, made as a result of international pressure, and nearly 10 years after the 
women began to seek transfer). 
 154. See AMNESTY INT’L, MEXICO: NEW REPORTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
VIOLATIONS BY THE MILITARY 8 (2011) (describing the inability to gather data on 
human rights abuses committed by the military and the failure by civilian and 
  
982 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [27:4 
of human rights abuses are usually complex in nature involving 
copious evidence and investigation.155 Furthermore, interested parties 
have filed complaints and procedures under existing Mexican law 
and often inquire into the status of their cases.156 The behavior of the 
military, as well as civilian judicial authorities, has led to widespread 
impunity.157 These factors, taken into consideration with evidence 
that the infringements under considerations are not minor infractions, 
but human rights abuses, show that the state is not responding within 
a reasonable time.158 Mexico is violating Articles 8 and 25 by failing 
to uphold this due process requirement.159 
Cases are not being transferred to civilian jurisdiction ex officio as 
demonstrated by the only two cases that have been transferred, which 
were removed only after making demands to the PGJM and the 
Attorney General.160 The Radilla Resolution requires that 
 
military courts to publish relevant information). 
 155. See, e.g., Radilla-Pacheco v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 209, ¶ 245 
(Nov. 23, 2009) (affirming that a case of a forced disappearance of over 35 years is 
considered complex); Lacayo v. Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 30, ¶ 78 (Jan. 29, 1997) (finding that 
where the investigation involved large amounts of evidence and extensive 
investigation the case was complex). 
 156. But see AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 154, at 8 (noting that the number of 
complaints received by local human rights nongovernmental organizations is far 
greater than that received by legal bodies as many individuals do not lodge 
complaints because they fear for their lives). 
 157. See BRICKER, supra note 45, at 4 (observing that, as of 2011, military 
courts under Calderón punished only one soldier for committing a violation against 
a civilian). 
 158. See Lacayo, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 30, ¶ 81 (applying a "global 
analysis of the proceeding" in finding a five year lapse between the time a court 
ordered a proceeding and judicial action being taken was not reasonable). 
 159. Id. 
 160. See Hanako Taniguchi, Indígenas Buscan Enjuiciar a Militares por 
Violación en una Corte Civil [Indigenous Seek to Prosecute Military for Rape 
in Civil Court], CNN MÉXICO (July 28, 2011), http://mexico.cnn.com/ 
nacional/2011/07/28/indigenas-buscan-enjuiciar-a-militares-por-violacion-en-una-
corte-civil (noting that the victims presented a formal request to the Attorney 
General and PGJM); see also BRICKER, supra note 45, at 10 (noting that cases are 
transferred only after an injunction has been filed); Kenneth Roth, Letter to 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (July 13, 2009), 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/07/13/letter-secretary-state-hillary-clinton#_ftn7 
(describing in an open letter by Human Rights Watch Executive Director the 
process by which the decisions of military tribunals can be challenged, noting that 
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investigation is conducted by civilian authorities once a complaint is 
filed in federal court, but many cases do not make it from the police 
station to federal court.161 Prosecutors often choose not to prosecute 
or to send the case to a military tribunal.162 With the increasing 
number of soldiers taking over law enforcement positions, the 
likelihood of prosecutors investigating cases involving the military is 
further reduced.163  
2. The Policy of Militarization to Combat Crimes Undermines 
Mexico’s Ability to Conduct Effective Investigations of Crimes in 
Compliance with Articles 1, 2, 8, and 25 
The Radilla Resolution fails to prevent the policy of substituting 
police forces for military personnel who are not trained to conduct 
adequate investigations. Because of this deficiency, Mexico remains 
in violation of Articles 8 and 25, in connection with Articles 1 and 2 
of the American Convention.164 According to IACtHR jurisprudence, 
the state has an obligation to conduct thorough and effective 
investigations.165 Investigations, similarly to trials, must be 
 
there is no direct appeal from a military tribunal and that victims’ only recourse is 
to file for an injunction—amparo—asking for civil courts to take action, or for 
military tribunals to reconsider decisions to close investigations based upon 
deprivation of due process rights). 
 161. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 154, at 11 (describing the case of 
Brenda Balderas whose complaint regarding the disappearance of her husband, and 
the torture of and detention of others by military authorities was repeatedly 
dismissed by the Attorney General, even though Balderas had personal knowledge 
of the circumstances surround the detention). 
 162. See id.; see also BRICKER, supra note 45, at 5 (detailing the Attorney 
General’s policy of automatically transferring cases involving active duty military 
personnel to military jurisdiction). 
 163. See BRICKER, supra note 45, at 4 (suggesting that the Mexican government 
could have foreseen a rise in human rights violations as a consequence of 
militarization, since the military is not “trained to interact with civilians within . . . 
a minimal framework of human rights”). 
 164. Radilla Resolution, supra note 15; see also NEITHER RIGHTS NOR 
SECURITY, supra note 7, at 6 (reporting that in 24 cases of extrajudicial killings 
which Human Rights Watch obtained evidence of, soldiers in a majority of the 
cases tampered with crime scenes to make the victims appear to be aggressors, or 
to shift suspicion of responsibility to organized crime elements). 
 165. Radilla-Pacheco v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, 
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 209, ¶ 192 (Nov. 23, 2009) 
(declaring that an effective investigation shall in its totality aim to achieve truth 
with the ultimate purpose of punishment for those responsible). 
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impartial,166 and the use of the military to investigate a human rights 
violation committed by the military presents a clear conflict of 
interest.167  
Investigations by militarized police forces into crimes that are 
committed by the military often lead to a failure by the state to 
ensure effective investigations.168 In an effective investigation into a 
human rights violation, investigators must preserve evidence, 
identify possible witnesses, obtain statements, and diligently attempt 
to determine key facts regarding the crime.169 Investigators must 
thoroughly examine the scene of the crime and have the technology 
to do so.170 
The Mexican armed forces are not trained to conduct adequate 
investigations.171 They are trained to use search and destroy 
techniques rather than the art of evidence preservation, and indeed 
often fabricate evidence.172 In addition, the federal government 
allocates insufficient financial resources, which enhances the risk of 
corruption and abuse of power.173 Due to fundamental differences in 
 
 166. See Rosendo Cantú v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations 
and Legal Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 216 (Aug. 31, 2010) 
(affirming that in cases involving human rights violations of civilians, military 
tribunals do not satisfy the requirement of independence and impartiality). 
 167. See Mexico: Deliver Justice for Killings, Disappearances in Monterrey, 
supra note 35, at 10 (citing a 2009 report by Human Rights Watch and anecdotal 
evidence from four cases of disappearance or extrajudicial killing to conclude that 
“Mexico’s military justice system lacks the independence and impartiality 
necessary to provide victims with an effective remedy through meaningful 
investigation and prosecution” of human rights violators). 
 168. See id. (recognizing that the consolidated judicial and executive authority 
of the defense secretary severely limits civilian oversight and public scrutiny of the 
military justice system). 
 169. See Radilla-Pacheco, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 209, ¶¶ 178-90 
(analyzing the failure of military investigators to ascertain basic facts such as the 
location, time, and cause of the crime). 
 170. Id. 
 171. See WITHERS ET AL., supra note 27, at 25 (asserting that military personnel 
receive little of the training in conducting criminal investigations or collecting 
evidence that police officers undergo). 
 172. See id. (pointing out that the military’s training and available resources 
“designed to kill the enemy” rather than address criminal activities); see also 
NEITHER RIGHTS NOR SECURITY, supra note 7, at 6 (mentioning that crime scenes 
are frequently altered to shift responsibility for crimes). 
 173. See WITHERS ET AL., supra note 27, at 26 (observing that low salaries often 
encourage military personnel to engage in illicit activities to supplement their 
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mission and techniques between the military and civilian law 
enforcement, a militarized police force leads to inadequate 
investigations that are rarely conducted ex officio and within a 
reasonable period of time.174 Mexico remains in violation of the 
American Convention because of its application of militarized police 
to investigate and adjudicate crimes committed by soldiers against 
civilians.175  
IV.RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. MEXICO’S CONGRESS SHOULD ENACT LEGISLATION THAT 
ENDS MILITARY JURISDICTION FOR CRIMES AGAINST CIVILIANS 
AND TRANSFERS PENDING INVESTIGATIONS AND CASES TO 
CIVILIAN COURTS 
Mexico must adopt legislation that ensures that human rights 
violations committed by the military will be investigated and 
adjudicated in civilian courts.176 To do so, Mexico must modify 
Article 57 of the Military Justice Code to be in compliance with 
Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention.177 This modification 
 
income); see also Mexico: Deliver Justice for Killings, Disappearances in 
Monterrey, supra note 35 (reporting mishandling of investigations by military 
personnel and explaining that in a fact-finding mission in Nuevo Leon, Human 
Rights Watch found major deficiencies in military investigations, including a 
failure to interview witnesses, visit locations of the crime, and ascertain basic 
information regarding the facts of the crime). 
 174. See NEITHER RIGHTS NOR SECURITY, supra note 7, at 16 (discussing how 
deficiencies in investigations by security sources leave prosecutors with little 
evidence to build a case on, forcing prosecutors either to abandon cases altogether, 
or to initiate new investigations to find credible evidence). 
 175. American Convention, supra note 75, arts. 1, 2, 8, 25; see also AMNESTY 
INT’L, supra note 154, at 8 (indicating that, besides violating international law, the 
military’s self-policing of human rights violations against civilians obstructs the 
ability of families to ascertain the location of detainees and prevent further abuses 
against victims who have already suffered human rights violations). 
 176. See discussion supra Parts II.B, III.A (discussing the duty to ensure that the 
competent court principle is applied in cases against civilians). See generally 
BRICKER, supra note 45 (describing legislation proposed by Senator René Arce, 
and supported by the IACtHR, that modifies Article 57 to prohibit military 
jurisdiction in cases involving the violation of human rights or in which civilians 
are amongst the victims). 
 177. See supra notes 127-36 and accompanying text (describing how article 57 
conflicts with the principle of the competent court and preempts the Radilla 
Resolution). 
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would prevent Article 57 from applying to crimes committed by 
active soldiers against civilians.178  
In addition, legislation should mandate that cases pending in 
military jurisdiction be transferred ex officio and immediately.179 
This will not only be a step toward compliance with the American 
Convention, but it will reduce the level of impunity, increase 
transparency in judicial processes, and allow for appellate review.180  
B. THE MEXICAN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD LIMIT ITS USE 
OF MILITARY IN CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT  
Mexico should refrain from supplanting law enforcement with 
military personnel.181 This leads to politicization of the military and 
consequently a lack of political will to strengthen civilian law 
enforcement in order to combat crime.182 The use of military 
personnel to investigate and adjudicate crimes committed by soldiers 
leads to high rates of impunity.183 If military personnel are used to 
fight organized crime, it must supplement police operations.184 In 
 
 178. See supra notes 128-39 and accompanying text (discussing the conflict 
between the principle of the competent court and Military Justice Code Article 57). 
 179. See discussion supra Part III.B (describing the duty to conduct 
investigations diligently, impartially, and ex officio, and the failures of military 
investigators to meet this duty). 
 180. See supra note 165 (discussing the lack of transparency and civilian 
oversight in military tribunals); NEITHER RIGHTS NOR SECURITY, supra note 7 
(affirming that military courts do not deter soldier misconduct, as evidenced by the 
fact that human rights groups in Mexico report that incidents of human rights 
abuses by the military are increasing). 
 181. See Janine Zúñiga, Mexico Seeks Solutions to Drug War: Calderón willing 
to consider legalization, San Diego Union Tribune (Aug. 14, 2010), 
http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/2010/aug/14/mexico-seeks-solutions-to-
drug-war (mentioning that soldiers are deficient at policing smaller crimes in 
communities where the military has supplanted civilian security personnel). 
 182. See WITHERS ET AL., supra note 27, at 14 (noting that the weakening of the 
civilian system leads to an increased and self-perpetuating reliance upon the 
military to perform internal police functions). 
 183. See NEITHER RIGHTS NOR SECURITY, supra note 7, at 9 (observing that in 
five Mexican states, where 1,615 investigations into violations were handled by the 
military since 2007, not a single soldier has been convicted, and that less than one 
percent of investigations opened by PGJM between 2007 and June, 2011 resulted 
in convictions). 
 184. See Radilla-Pacheco v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 209, ¶ 272 
(Nov. 23, 2009) (mandating that military jurisdiction be reduced or even revoked 
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addition, the military should be assigned specific timelines for their 
operations to ensure empowerment of police forces to face organized 
crime.185 Careful delineation between military and police tasks will 
reduce the risk of military supplanting police forces as well.186  
Should the federal government choose to supplement civilian 
police with military forces, legislation should mandate increased 
training in the area of human rights and investigations.187 Training in 
the areas of gathering and maintenance of evidence must be provided 
to ensure that investigations are effective and there is access to 
justice.188 Key aspects of training should include the preservation of 
crime scenes, interviewing witnesses, and due process guarantees 
under international law.189 
C. THE UNITED STATES SHOULD SUPPORT CIVILIAN POLICE 
FORCES THROUGH FUNDING, TRAINING, AND SOCIAL PROGRAMS 
The United States continues to send military financial assistance 
as part of its strategy in the “war on drugs.”190 Rather than 
 
in times of peace). 
 185. See WITHERS ET AL., supra note 27, at 26 (contending that “as long as 
governments continue to make up for police forces’ deficiencies with military 
power, law enforcement agencies will never develop to their proper capacities”); 
see also Pérez & Martinez, supra note 37 (discussing a lack of political will to 
withdraw troops as the government becomes more reliant on their resources). 
 186. See WITHERS ET AL., supra note 27, at 14 (discussing areas of overlap in 
the roles served by Mexico’s military and traditional civilian-controlled police 
functions, including control of public protests, civic and social assistance, and 
protection of domestic private assets). 
 187. See Mexico: Deliver Justice for Killings, Disappearances in Monterrey, 
supra note 35 (describing the lack of due diligence by military in investigations 
including the failure to interview witnesses, visit crime scenes, and follow basic 
procedure). 
 188. See WITHERS ET AL., supra note 27, at 25 (describing military operations 
and the use of search and destroy techniques, which demonstrate inadequate 
preservation of evidence, and describing a lack of appropriate training and 
resources). 
 189. See NEITHER RIGHTS NOR SECURITY, supra note 7, at 16 (discussing 
inadequacies in soldier investigations, including crime scene tampering and the use 
of coerced confessions). 
 190. See Doris Gómora, Aumenta 400% del Pentágano [400% Increase from the 
Pentagon], EL UNIVERSAL (Aug. 11, 2011), http://www.eluniversal.com.mx 
/primera/37477.html (observing that between the years 2007 and 2011, the United 
States increased its military spending in Mexico by four hundred percent from 
fifteen million to seventy-one million dollars per year). 
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emphasizing funding of the Mexican military, the United States 
should increase monetary and training assistance to police forces.191 
Such support will help enable them to tackle issues like drug 
trafficking and organized crime, while safeguarding human rights.192 
Increased U.S. law enforcement training of local police forces, rather 
than military-to-military and military-to-police training will limit the 
use of military tactics to fight crime.193  
The United States should condition military financing on the 
implementation of socioeconomic programs, such as basic schooling 
and vocational training programs, thereby shrinking the employment 
pool for organized crime.194 Breaking up criminal networks will 
reduce the pressure on the federal government to use military to 
 
 191. See WITHERS ET AL., supra note 27, at 28 (calling upon the United States to 
provide aid for police training focusing on “comprehensive institutional 
strengthening of law enforcement,” as opposed to limiting training to counter-
narcotics efforts, and recommending implementation investigative training 
programs for civilian police such as the Justice Department’s existing International 
Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP)); see also 
Narcoterrorism and the Long Reach of U.S. Law Enforcement: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. Comm. on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade of the H. Comm. on 
Foreign Affairs, 112th Cong. 38 (2011) [hereinafter Narcoterrorism Hearing] 
(statement of Vanda Felbab-Brown, Fellow, The Brookings Institute) (describing 
systemic weaknesses in civilian police forces, and predicting that “comprehensive 
police reform will require a sustained commitment [by the United States] over a 
generation at least.”). 
 192. See Narcoterorrism Hearing, supra note 191, at 28 (noting that police 
forces in Mexico are extremely weak, but arguing that there is more complex 
institutional weakness driving organized crime that needs a multifaceted response, 
including socioeconomic development). 
 193. See Jeanna Cullinan, North Mexico Police Desert Training Course, IN 
SIGHT: ORGANIZED CRIME IN THE AMERICAS (Sept. 6, 2011), 
http://insightcrime.org/insight-latest-news/item/1513-North-mexico-police-desert-
training-course (reporting on a desertion incident at a military training facility in 
the state of Chihuahua where 350 police officers from the state of Tamaulipas were 
receiving training in military tactics and where they may have been deprived of 
food in addition to being subject to grueling hours); see also WITHERS ET AL., 
supra note 27, at 27 (recommending that the United States should refrain 
completely from training police in military tactics). 
 194. See Narcoterrorism Hearing, supra note 191 at 39 (arguing that fortifying 
socioeconomic institutions can counter drug cartel power over marginalized 
civilian groups); see also Christopher Sherman, U.S. to Train Police in Mexico, 
SALT LAKE TRIB. (Aug. 17, 2011), http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/world/52406860-
68/mexico-training-state-brownfield.html.csp (reporting that this type of training 
has begun to take place as part of foreign assistance). 
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supplant police forces.195 Socioeconomic funding can raise the level 
of education and standards of living, which may lead to a reduction 
in organized crime.196 Several scholars have argued that the way to 
combat organized crime is much like combatting fraud and money 
laundering operations in the United States.197 These tactics may 
prove more effective than blunt force.198 Because militarization is 
occurring rapidly, immediate steps should be taken to ensure that 
training of police forces and the military in basic aspects of 
investigation is a prerequisite to certain U.S. foreign assistance 
programs in Mexico.199 Although Mexico faces complex public 
violence problems, largely due to organized crime, civilian police 
forces should take a leading role in investigating domestic crimes, 
and ordinary courts should then prosecute alleged perpetrators.200  
V. CONCLUSION 
The Radilla Resolution is in accordance with the Right to Justice 
under the American Convention and has laid the foundation for the 
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Comm. Foreign Affairs, 112th Cong. 45 (2011) (statement of Andrew Selee, 
Director, Mexico Institute, Woodrow Wilson Center) (arguing that the mapping of 
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 199. See CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32724, 
MEXICO: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 11 (2011) (explaining that fifteen percent of 
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Narcotics Control and Law 
Enforcement (INCLE) funds can be withheld until the Secretary of State reports 
that Mexico is meeting human rights standards—incentive for Mexico to change 
its policies); see also supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text (describing rapid 
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 200. See WGEID Press Release, supra note 48 (expressing concern about the 
reliance on military personnel and courts in the area of public security while 
acknowledging that Mexico has taken steps to initiate reform of the civilian 
security apparatuses, such as establishing the office of Executive Secretary of 
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Supreme Court to rule the Military Justice Code Article 57 
unconstitutional. The IACtHR has made it clear that military courts 
do not satisfy the principle of the competent court.201 In order to 
ensure that civilian rather than military courts are used, the Mexican 
Supreme Court or the legislature must invalidate article 57. 
Moreover, cases pending under military authority should be 
transferred immediately and ex officio to civilian jurisdiction to 
ensure their effective investigations.  
The policy of militarization of police forces can be limited in order 
to ensure that police are conducting investigations in which evidence 
is pursued, key witnesses are interviewed, and crime scenes are 
thoroughly investigated. These basic aspects of training should be 
emphasized in U.S. foreign policy. Addressing these elements will 
bring Mexico closer to compliance with Articles 1, 2, 8, and 25 of 
the American Convention.  
 
 201. See, e.g., Radilla-Pacheco v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 209, ¶ 272 
(Nov. 23, 2009) (noting the IACtHR’s repeated affirmation that military criminal 
jurisdiction has an extremely limited scope in times of peace and applies only 
when military rights are threatened). 
